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ABSTRACT
Strong climate institutional governance is necessary for countries to meet 
their international climate mitigation commitments. This article shows that 
while South Africa steadily created climate institutions up to 2011, these 
failed to take hold in the following years. Also, despite the systemically 
critical energy sector dominating the emissions profile, these climate institu-
tions had no purchase over it. This situation is largely due to South Africa’s 
political economy of energy, which gave powerful actors the sustained 
ability to block meaningful institutionalisation of decarbonisation in the 
energy sector. As a result, South Africa’s climate institutions play few of 
the roles expected for successful institutionalization of climate action, with 
energy institutions instead playing a shadow climate governance role. This 
case suggests that conceptions of climate institutional governance in coun-
tries where single sectors dominate in emissions and power must accom-
modate the roles of institutions affecting climate outcomes despite this not 
being their primary objective.
KEYWORDS South Africa; climate institutions; minerals-energy complex; just transition; socio-economic 
transformation
The Paris Agreement on Climate Change breaks with most international 
treaties in focusing primarily on national ambitions to be achieved through 
national institutions (Falkner 2016). Emerging powers, including South 
Africa, have been at the centre of this shift from top-down to bottom-up 
approaches, insisting that their national development ambitions must shape 
any international commitments to greenhouse gas (GHG) emission mitiga-
tion (Nelson 2016). Wherever climate institutions are found, at the interna-
tional or national level, there are difficult governance challenges to be solved. 
Yet, there is little literature about the origins and functioning of national 
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climate institutions, as opposed to policies, and even less about such institu-
tions in developing countries like South Africa.
What is a climate institution? As an introduction to this special issue 
notes, the answer is not obvious. Both words in the phrase introduce 
potentially divergent understandings. The academic literature on institutions 
has long been divided. A narrow view identifies formal, especially govern-
mental, agencies and organizations as the most relevant institutions. This is 
countered by a broader understanding of institutions as decision-making 
centres and locations of authority of various kinds (Ostrom 2010, Carlisle 
and Gruby 2019), captured in concepts like polycentricity, which is increas-
ingly used in the context of climate governance (e.g. Jordan et al. 2018, pp. 8– 
9). Here, we follow the focus of the special issue, on the role of the state in 
mediating polycentric climate governance (Dubash 2021).
Similarly, are climate institutions those with specific aims and mandates 
to act on climate issues or are they the broader set of institutions whose 
actions have an impact on climate outcomes? Our exploration of the institu-
tions that are important for shaping climate governance in South Africa over 
the past 25 years suggests that, in this arguably extreme case, an appreciation 
of the latter is critical to understanding the process of institutionalising 
climate considerations more widely (Dubash 2021). As such, we suggest 
that theories of climate institutional governance must be capable of consid-
ering how climate considerations are layered onto institutions that do not 
have climate as their primary objective – and which may even have anti- 
climate orientation – which we call ‘institutionalising decarbonisation’. 
A deep re-orientation of institutional structures in key areas must be within 
theoretical reach.
The introduction to this special issue also identifies three key governance 
challenges for any climate institutions that emerge (Dubash 2021). Here, we 
describe them and sketch how the South African context may modify how 
they are approached. An overarching theme is that deliberate South African 
institution-building in the climate arena has often reflected the narrow 
conception of what climate institutions might be – creating isolated govern-
ment institutions with narrow, climate-constrained mandates – that then fail 
to meet the governance challenges and thus have little purchase on actual 
climate outcomes.
The first climate governance challenge is that climate institutions must 
somehow cover the scope and scale of the climate problem itself, which is 
notoriously multi-faceted and long-term. Traditional views of climate gov-
ernance foreground the importance of strategic coordination across the 
many sectors influenced by climate change. Centralising institutions and 
economy-wide measures are seen as critical solutions to this coordination 
problem (Candel and Biesbroek 2016). Conversely, governance concepts like 
polycentricity stress that a system of multiple and partially overlapping 
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institutions can provide more resilient approaches to governing a problem of 
the scope and scale of climate change (Carlisle and Gruby 2019). We argue 
that South Africa’s political economy challenges these common understand-
ings. Economic power and responsibility for greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions in the country are concentrated to an unusual extent in a small number 
of fossil fuel-based actors (Baker et al. 2014), with 84% of historical emissions 
in the energy sector. Thus, addressing the scope and scale of climate change 
is mostly about reorientating a single, very-important economic sector 
dominated by a few powerful actors.
The second climate governance challenge is that climate institutions must 
be able to set and meet targets that are ambitious enough to achieve 
a decarbonization transformation. This is difficult for any country and 
made more challenging by the concentration of emissions and powerful 
actors in the South African energy sector, as well as by the country’s 
particular history of racial exclusion.
The first two challenges generate a third, that of structuring interest 
politics in ways that reinforce future climate action (Mildenberger 2020). 
A growing research agenda examines how interest politics can set a path 
dependency that reinforces the status quo or reorientates towards climate 
transformation (Lockwood et al. 2017, Stokes 2020). Achieving this typically 
requires some combination of compelling narrative construction (Jinnah 
2017) and/or motivating the willing participation of potential climate losers 
and other powerful actors. In South Africa, this challenge is again primarily 
confronted in the energy sector.
Beyond looking at the outcomes of climate institutional governance, this 
special issue project also examines how this governance evolves, tracing path 
dependencies and critical junctures. These are shown here in three historical 
stages in South Africa. Following the framework of this special issue, we note 
the impact of several major historical sources of continuity, in national 
bureaucratic configurations and dominant interest structures (Lockwood 
et al. 2017, Mildenberger 2020) whose roots lie in the country’s colonial 
and apartheid past. For setting off critical junctures and spurring national 
action on global concerns, international agenda-setting processes were often 
important (Frank et al. 2000). At the same time, the powerful actors in the 
African National Congress (ANC), including national presidents, were play-
ing a two-level game (Putnam 1988). Even as they asserted the country’s 
moral authority abroad, promoting climate action, they have been engaged 
in more complicated struggles within the country. As elsewhere, framing 
processes offered meanings and causal analysis to political participants, 
shaping narratives that can motivate a strong role for climate institutions – 
or not (Jinnah 2017).
The article is based on field research since 2013 by both authors; we con-
ducted nearly 50 open-ended interviews with members of South Africa’s energy 
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and climate communities. Expert interviewees were based in relevant govern-
ment agencies, non-governmental institutions, and industry sectors. One of us 
could also add insights from her long-term experience as a South African 
climate mitigation policy practitioner. Government documents help to supple-
ment the information from these primary sources.
Climate change in South Africa: a background
The overwhelming majority of South Africa’s national GHG emissions come 
from the energy sector, with coal-based electricity and heat production 
accounting for almost half of those (see Figure 1). The electricity utility 
Eskom, a vertically integrated state-owned entity, still has a near-monopoly 
on electricity generation. Sasol, a synthetic liquid fuels company, contributes 
about 11% of the emissions. Between them, these two powerful actors have 
been responsible for more than half of South Africa’s GHG emissions. On the 
other side of the equation, 28 firms in the Energy Intensive Users Group 
consume 40% of the country’s electricity supply.1
Collectively, these actors are central figures in a national political econ-
omy termed the ‘Minerals-Energy Complex’ (MEC), which was initiated in 
the colonial years and entrenched during apartheid (Fine, Ben and Zavareh 
Figure 1. South Africa’s net 2015 greenhouse gas emissions (Department of Environmental 
Affairs 2019).
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Rustomjee 1996). The MEC favours large industry and cheap large-tech 
energy for exploiting the country’s mineral wealth, powered through coal 
and some nuclear technologies. It is concentrated in pockets of the ANC, 
government, the energy and mining sectors, the military and heavy 
industry.2 The monopolistic electricity sector structure was legitimated post- 
apartheid by its ability to advance the objectives of racial transformation and 
redistributive development (Ting and Byrne 2020) with a dual developmen-
tal mandate of powering the energy-intensive economy and electrifying 
previously disadvantaged areas. As state-owned entity, Eskom has been 
central to balancing the interests of state and business within the MEC, as 
well as the interests of Labour and factions within the ANC itself. 
Presidential powers are impacted by what they do with energy institutions. 
As with most things South African, the MEC is racially profiled: black 
Africans participated historically only as ‘cheap and unskilled labour’ 
(Trollip 2020, p. 28). Post-democracy, a black political elite gained access 
to rent-seeking in the electricity and coal sectors (Trollip 2020). Whilst we 
acknowledge the MEC’s ongoing evolution in the South African economy 
(Ting and Byrne 2020), we use it in this article to highlight the country’s very 
particular energy path dependency.
Given the dominance of the liberating ANC party since democracy in 1994, 
climate change has not been an electoral issue in South Africa. Instead, climate 
change is tackled inside the party leadership circle and bureaucracy, including 
Eskom. Interest structures, and especially the ANC’s historic ties to the labour 
movement, are influential in those sites as well as in specific consultative and 
planning institutions like the National Economic Development and Labour 
Council (NEDLAC) and the National Planning Commission (Beresford 2016).
South Africa’s colonial and apartheid history has resulted in critical needs 
for poverty and inequality alleviation that still depend on racial transformation 
of the economy. As one of the world’s most unequal countries, this inequality is 
racially profiled and replicated throughout its energy sector (Hochstetler 2021). 
So, whilst racial transformation and equality are not always central components 
of climate politics, they are in South Africa. Exacerbating this situation is the 
deep ideological divide around the choice of economic model to achieve this 
transformation. Unresolved at the time of the country’s democratic transition, 
the division continues to fester and confound South Africa’s progress. In 
a perverse version of these imperatives, the Zuma administration (2009– 
2018) used the domestic demands for racial transformation as part of a cover 
for a state capture project that targeted national energy institutions for patron-
age and personal profit (Chipkin, Ivor and Mark Swilling 2017, Trollip 2020).
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 5
Three historical stages of climate institutions: international 
impulses, national initiatives, and motivating frames
This section of the article traces the development of South Africa’s climate 
institutional governance over time. After an early and ambitious phase of 
building climate institutions that was prompted by international negotia-
tions (2005–2011), resistance from domestic actors with vested interests in 
the burgeoning state capture endeavour stymied advances in institutiona-
lising decarbonisation in a second phase (2012–2018). A change in govern-
ment in 2018 enabled a renewed societal initiative to seek a transformative 
transition in the energy sector and beyond. Climate institutions themselves 
are still incipient, but the just transition framing together with the compe-
titive economics of renewables offer a first real possibility of institutionalis-
ing decarbonisation in the critical energy sector.
Stage 1: international impetus (2005–2011)
International processes
Early international climate negotiations unfolded alongside South Africa’s 
democratic transition, and thus represented one of the first opportunities for 
South Africa to move from an international pariah to a ‘responsible’ interna-
tional participant, albeit one that also newly claimed the status of ‘developing 
country’ (Masters 2011). The frame for this period is observed in a quote from 
the Department of Environment, which accepted the country’s ‘moral as well as 
legal obligations . . . to contributing its fair share to the global GHG mitigation 
effort’ (Department of Environmental Affairs 2011a, p. 24).3 South African 
unions joined some of the first international labour discussions that spoke of 
just transitions, in 1999, where a just transition was identified with decent work, 
poverty eradication and environmental sustainability (Stevis et al. 2020, pp. 12– 
13). However, in the classic fashion of the two-level game, these international 
proclamations lacked a strong domestic counterpart.
The international process motivated the first steps to building climate 
institutions. The primary climate institution in this period was the 
Department of Environment, which created an early stakeholder consulta-
tion platform, the National Climate Change Committee, in 1994. In this 
stage, its climate action closely followed international timetables and frames, 
as did its bureaucratic organization. For the first decade, the Department had 
only 1.75 staff working on climate change, but a specialist international 
negotiating unit was added in 2004 with three times more staff than the 
domestic policy unit (Department of Environment, Forestry, and Fisheries, 
2019). In 2005, a Chief Directorate for Air Quality Management and Climate 
Change was added, becoming increasingly technocratic and expertise- 
oriented (Chandrashekeran et al. 2017).
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The long term mitigation scenario planning process
This increasingly technocratic focus allowed the Department of Environment 
to start addressing the target-setting challenge. It compiled a first emissions 
inventory in 2002, a climate change response strategy in 2004, and included 
600 participants in a 2005 ‘Climate Action Now’ conference that really 
launched its climate agenda (Lukey 2020, pp. 4–6). With a Cabinet mandate, 
the Department also invited scientists, civil society, labour and business – even 
Eskom – to launch an evidence-based Long-Term Mitigation Scenario 
(LTMS) planning process, conducted in 2006/7 (Raubenheimer 2011). The 
report revealed that, contrary to dominant thinking within the country at the 
time, South Africa had a significant role to play in mitigation.
Cabinet confirmed these findings by announcing a GHG ‘peak, plateau and 
decline trajectory range’ to 2050 (Van Schalkwyk 2008). In a surprise announce-
ment in Copenhagen, President Zuma committed to this trajectory internation-
ally, strongly indicating climate ambition despite the fact that a consultative 
climate summit earlier that year had not found consensus on key issues like the 
country’s energy mix or a carbon tax (Lukey 2020, p. 12). Nonetheless, this 
position was reiterated at the Conference of Parties South Africa hosted in 
Durban in 2011. Post-LTMS, an Inter-Governmental Climate Change 
Committee was established in 2008 to co-ordinate across the levels of govern-
ment. Cabinet also approved an Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate 
Change in 2009 to coordinate the national bureaucracy (Giordano et al. 2011). 
Together with the long-standing National Climate Change Committee, these 
bodies produced the 2011 National Climate Change Response White Paper.
This apparently smooth advance is difficult to understand in the South Africa 
we have described, but the critical juncture of the LTMS process arose from 
different locations. The LTMS itself arose from an internationally oriented 
policy window, engineered by policy entrepreneurs in the Department of 
Environment (Tyler and Torres Gunfaus 2017). The Department’s international 
negotiating team was well led,4 capacitated and forward thinking, and connected 
to a network of strong domestic research institutions (Raubenheimer 2011). In 
addition, the ANC afforded political legitimacy through a progressive declara-
tion on climate change at its National Conference in 2007, following the party’s 
moral tradition in international relations and pressure from its African neigh-
bours (Masters 2011). A national red-green coalition of labour and environ-
mentalists led their international counterparts in pressuring governments for 
more climate action at the Durban conference (Cock 2012).
Renewable energy
Domestic-facing policies, though, never matched up to the international- 
facing ones. In particular, the need for transformative changes in the energy 
sector was not made visible. A ‘status quo’ approach predominated, with 
a background assumption that ‘a radical change of the socio-economic and 
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political chessboard is not necessary and that market forces and business will 
drive the change’ (Forti 2013, p. 3). The LTMS was presented as a ‘policy 
informing’ rather than ‘policy prescriptive’ exercise, so MEC participants did 
not anticipate early implementation (Tyler and Torres Gunfaus 2017). Its 
findings did not highlight the need for an energy transition and redistributive 
development, nor that there would be losers.
South Africa did, however, begin taking some initial, hesitant steps toward 
renewable energy in this stage. A new Renewable Energy Independent Power 
Producers Procurement Programme (REIPPPP) allowed private generators 
to bid in competitive auctions to supply renewable energy to the national 
electricity grid (Hochstetler 2021, pp. 47–48). In South Africa’s first long- 
term electricity plan developed outside of Eskom, the Integrated Resource 
Plan (IRP) 2010, costly renewable energy was included because of what it 
could contribute to South African industry and skills development 
(Department of Energy 2011, p. 8). Bidders in the REIPPPP were judged 
on both cost and what they could contribute to South Africa’s economic 
transformation through local content used, jobs and ownership shares for 
black South Africans, and other benefits offered to local communities (Tait 
et al. 2013). The IRP 2010 included a carbon constraint allocating 
a grandfathered portion of the Peak, Plateau and Decline trajectory to 
electricity generation, and noted that the new nuclear and renewable energy 
in the plan would help South Africa meet its climate mitigation obligations.
However, there was no institutional mechanism where climate and energy 
domains were engaged on an equal footing. The IRP process itself was 
institutionally disconnected from the climate process, with major roles 
played by Eskom and the Energy Intensive Users Group (Department of 
Energy 2011).5 Exactly concurrently with the LTMS, the REIPPPP, and 
Zuma’s Copenhagen Pledge, Eskom was finalizing plans to build two of the 
world’s largest coal-powered plants, revealing how little the utility had been 
influenced by the climate agenda. The government’s preferred low carbon 
technology at the time remained nuclear, aligned with the MEC’s large-tech 
mining fundamentals.6 This conveniently also fit with Zuma’s preference for 
a large nuclear deal with Russia, which he pushed throughout his adminis-
trations (Chipkin, Ivor and Mark Swilling 2017). The prominence of Eskom 
in all these plans reflected its role both in intra-ANC politics. As the patron-
age network made inroads, the institution rapidly weakened, driven by 
extractive management, unsupportive tariffs, increasingly precarious electri-
city supply, and the costs of the two coal mega-projects.
Climate institutions had little influence over these energy decisions. Notably, 
the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change did not include the 
Ministry of Energy, Treasury, or Eskom, three of the most powerful and 
mitigation-relevant governmental actors (Giordano et al. 2011, p. 18). This 
was an institutional manifestation of energy policy and plans unfolding 
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according to their own logics, quite independent from climate logic. This 
institutional configuration had implications beyond the energy sector. 
Treasury had been developing a carbon tax since 2006, driven primarily by its 
constitutional mandate over tax policy and international developments in the 
environmental pricing arena as opposed to developments in climate policy.7 As 
a result, none of the initiatives of this period offered an economy-wide perspec-
tive that could bridge climate and energy issues, create equitable transformation, 
or permeate path-dependent energy sector logics.
Stage 2: national initiatives (2012–2018)
In Stage 2, even the uneven progress of Stage 1 was largely halted. Different 
departments drew on their own networks and cognitive maps to present alter-
natives for implementation of the Stage 1 policy positions, but little progress was 
made in unsettling energy sector logics. The Inter-Ministerial Committee went 
undeveloped, and the carbon tax inched through many periods of revision. The 
MEC actors showed less coordinated action at this stage, but all found different 
ways to challenge climate action. The unpredictable Zuma administration drew 
on narratives such as green economy and equitable transformation in its effort 
to retain broad appeal and obscure its main focus on rent extraction. 
Retrospectively, the assertion can be made that the stage’s main organizing 
theme was Zuma’s state capture project to privately gain from Eskom’s building 
of nuclear power and coal procurement, but this was not always apparent in the 
moment (Chipkin, Ivor and Mark Swilling 2017, Trollip 2020).
Climate policy implementation flounders
The formal climate institutions created in Stage 1 left a political vacuum in 
Stage 2. After supporting South Africa’s hosting of the Durban Conference of 
the Parties, the Inter-Ministerial Committee appears to have ceased operat-
ing. In its stead, the Department of Environment used bilateral meetings and 
regular Cabinet processes to advance the climate agenda through receptive 
line ministries. These were important, but the climate agenda lacked the 
energy centrepiece needed for effective action given the disengagement of the 
energy ministry.8 The Inter-Governmental Committee continued to hold 
some meetings after 2011, but with low-level participants who did not have 
the remit to take decisions.9 South Africa’s biennial reports to the UNFCCC 
continued to report on the existence of these climate institutions without any 
record of their actions (e.g. Department of Environmental Affairs 2017).
The timeframes for policy implementation set out in the 2011 White 
Paper were therefore not met. Treasury continued to work on its carbon 
tax independently of the Department of Environment’s ‘command and 
control’ carbon budgets. The existence of two unaligned economy-wide 
mitigation instruments allowed the MEC to delay and weaken the tax in 
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this stage.10 The Energy Intensive Users Group called the prospect of a tax 
a ‘looming Sword of Damocles for investors’, noting that it made little sense 
in South Africa where no electricity options existed outside Eskom, 
a position supported by the Department of Trade and Industry against its 
fellow ministry.11 As a regulated utility, Eskom would just pass the tax 
through to consumers (Rennkamp 2019).
As before, the Department of Environment was most successful in con-
tinuing to meet its international obligations: reporting to the UNFCCC, 
updating its GHG emissions inventories, and preparing a Nationally 
Determined Contribution (NDC) for the 2015 Paris Agreement. The NDC 
was notable for committing to an absolute economy-wide emissions reduc-
tion target range, although this again came without societal consensus and 
minimal implementation.
3. The electricity sector
Load-shedding after 2007 and the resulting sharp rise in electricity prices 
caused Eskom to renege on its dual developmental mandate of Stage 1. 
Questions about the right generation mix and particularly who would 
build it – Eskom (coal and nuclear), or independent power producers 
(renewables and some coal) – echoed the underlying ideological differences 
around South Africa’s model of economic development. They set off 
a political conflagration that dominated this stage, erratically fanned by the 
state capture project, and wholly out of the control of climate institutions.
The IRP of Stage 1, which represented an ‘all-of-the-above’ strategy, call-
ing for more renewables, nuclear- and coal-based electricity, was meant to be 
updated every 2 years. However, Stage 2 saw repeated new drafts that could 
not muster enough political support for adoption (Hochstetler 2021, pp. 46– 
47). Each of these drafts included dramatically different estimates for the 
quantities of different kinds of electricity needed. At the heart of the issue was 
the question of who would build it, with proponents for each technology 
claiming publicly that their choice responded to the growing pressure for 
redistributive economic transformation, although rent-seeking was also 
a major driver.
During this stage, the REIPPPP developed in ways that reflected the 
underlying ideological divisions. There was a stunningly quick drop in 
prices, following both global developments in renewables pricing and the 
high levels of competition in South Africa’s auctions (Bayer et al. 2018). For 
price-sensitive actors like the Energy Intensive Users Group, this develop-
ment started to transform their orientation to renewable energy.12 In 2014, 
the REIPPPP also delivered 84% of South Africa’s total foreign direct invest-
ment, drawing positive attention from the Ministers of Energy and 
Economic Development, but alarm from Eskom.13 However, even as costs 
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dropped, the REIPPPP failed to deliver a black-owned renewable energy 
sector, with international firms increasingly likely to win the auctions (Bayer 
et al. 2018, pp. 320–321), and it was correspondingly viewed as an ‘exclusive 
club’.14 While winning bids were required to create jobs for South Africans, 
the labour movement wanted public sector jobs in electricity and debated the 
gains (Cloete 2018). Despite a promising start, the incipient manufacturing 
industry was undermined by infighting and increasing uncertainty over the 
programme’s future after 2015 (Hochstetler 2021, pp. 121–124). Those 
involved in the state capture exploited these weaknesses and used the inflam-
matory rhetoric of ‘White Monopoly Capital’ to further turn organized 
labour against the technology (Chipkin, Ivor and Mark Swilling 2017).15 
Ultimately, Eskom simply refused to sign contracts with winners of the 
fourth REIPPPP round from 2016.
State capture deepens coal path dependency
During this stage the Zuma administration increasingly focused on utilising the 
country’s coal resources for illegal rent extraction, exploiting the weakness of the 
electricity sector’s monopolistic institutional form. Extensive documents and 
testimony have since shown that a small group around Zuma had personal 
interests in the looting of Eskom, with facilitators inside the institution 
(Eberhard and Godinho 2017).16 Other state capture arrangements were built 
around coal supply contracts (Trollip 2020, p. 19). The Zuma administration, 
Eskom, and organized labour all continued to support the monopolistic model 
for the electricity sector during this period, touting expensive nuclear power,17 
albeit for different underlying reasons.
The most effective resistance to state capture in the energy sector came 
from civil society groups, who were able to use court cases to temporarily halt 
nuclear and coal projects, often on procedural grounds (Hochstetler 2021, 
pp. 51–53). The Life After Coal Campaign cast its efforts in the language of 
just transition, echoing early efforts by the labour movement.
Due to the state capture project, the Presidency, Cabinet, Parliament and 
NEDLAC, together with the ANC itself, were tremendously weakened and 
distracted in Stage 2. None of these institutions championed decarbonisation 
from a strategic and systemic perspective, hampering both the Department of 
Environment and Treasury, which relied on them for policy legitimation18. 
Climate institutionalisation continued to be championed most consistently by 
the politically weak Department of Environment. Meanwhile, the systemically 
critical energy sector remained anti-mitigation. Given the lack of an effective 
Inter-Ministerial Climate Committee during this stage, together with the deeply 
entrenched carbon-intensive logics of the energy sector, this state of affairs is 
unsurprising.
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Stage 3: motivating frames (2018-present)
The third stage of climate institutionalisation began when Cyril Ramaphosa 
managed to best Jacob Zuma to secure the ANC Presidency in 2018. 
Ramaphosa, in power by a slim margin, inherited an ANC still largely 
beholden to the state capture lobby of the Zuma era, and a suite of eroded 
national institutions, chief among which was Eskom. He immediately set to 
work shoring these up. Whilst Ramaphosa regularly pronounces 
a supportive position on climate change and is slowly dismantling the 
state capture project, his re-combining of the Departments of Mineral 
Resources and Energy and appointment of a coal enthusiast as minister 
have undermined his ability to implement his own rhetoric. His political 
fragility is a feature of his presidency, acting as a profound constraint on 
energy sector reform. Internationally, he continued to advance the ANC’s 
ambitious position on climate change (e.g. Ramaphosa 2019), but with the 
usual different emphasis for a domestic audience.
Signs of progress on developing climate institutions
In this stage, Treasury’s dogged efforts finally resulted in a weakened 
version of the carbon tax (mid-2019). The Department of Environment 
released a draft Climate Change Bill for public comment in 2018 
(Department of Environmental Affairs 2018). The draft (re) establishes 
the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change, but with the crucial 
inclusion of the Energy, Public Enterprises (Eskom’s stakeholder) and 
Treasury Ministers in the quorum. Mechanisms are identified to take on 
the climate change co-ordination role at the Provincial and Municipal level. 
The Bill has yet to be promulgated, delaying its implementation. Still, it 
would be the first time that a formal climate institution includes the critical 
energy sector directly. In 2020, the Department also published a Low 
Emissions Development Strategy as required by the international policy 
process, indicating ambition to set a net zero carbon target for 2050.
Electricity, Eskom and renewables
In the energy arena, Eskom was forced to sign the outstanding REIPPPP 
contracts soon after Ramaphosa won the ANC presidency. An updated 
version of the IRP was finally adopted in 2019, including significant renew-
ables generation as Eskom’s coal fleet retires (Hochstetler 2021). This is a win 
for institutionalising decarbonisation, linked to the plummeting cost of 
renewables and storage. Nevertheless, the fossil fuel path dependencies 
remain: the IRP 2019 simultaneously includes new coal and nuclear at 
a cost premium, and little has been done to support the requisite institutional 
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reform in the sector to realise the renewables opportunity. Eskom itself 
received a new Chief Executive at the end of 2019 who has assertively pushed 
a reformist and green agenda, arguing that both are required to restore 
security of supply at least cost to the economy. De Ruyter’s approach is 
increasingly oppositional to the Energy Department’s anti-reformist stance 
and dogged pursuit of nuclear and gas that the energy regulator echoes. 
Thus, even though the energy sector is now to be represented in the Inter- 
Ministerial Climate Change Committee, this is no guarantee of the sector’s 
decarbonisation.
The rise of multi-centric climate governance
Outside of government, Phase 3 has seen a marked increase in energy- 
climate related activity. In the courts in 2020, the Life After Coal cam-
paign successfully overturned the Department of Environment’s environ-
mental authorisation of a new coal-fired power plant.19 In the same year, 
municipalities won the right to generate their own power as opposed to 
relying on Eskom. Increasing concern around the environmental, social, 
and governance profiles of investor portfolios has prompted an accelera-
tion of both domestic and international financiers moving away from 
fossil fuels.
These initiatives demonstrate an increasingly complex and multi-centric 
governance of climate-related issues. It is, however, not clear how far the 
combination of such interventions can go in the absence of an enabling 
energy policy and institutional forms. It is also even less clear that they will 
deliver on South Africa’s all important social and racial transformation 
agenda.
The rise of the just transition narrative
That said, Stage 3 has also seen the meteoric rise of the just transition 
narrative in South African policy circles, particularly in the electricity 
sector.20 This is significant because the narrative is strongly located in energy; 
is primarily about the domestic objective of redistributive development; and 
can position climate action as the co-benefit to this. Organised labour is 
credited with taking the term into Ramaphosa’s 2018 Job’s Summit, hosted 
by NEDLAC, which had been experiencing a comeback as a relevant con-
sultative body for primarily business and labour.21 The Summit proposed 
a Presidential Co-ordinating Commission on Climate Change ‘to coordinate 
and oversee the Just Transition, including how to maximise the opportu-
nities for jobs’ (Republic of South Africa 2018, p. 42). A National Planning 
Commission consultative conference mid-2019 endorsed the Presidential 
Commission to drive this (National Planning Commission 2019), and an 
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updated draft of the Climate Change Bill emerging from NEDLAC in 2020 
included the Commission as an advisory body comprised of both govern-
ment and social stakeholders. Commissioners were appointed late 2020.
Taken together, developments in this third stage are both promising and 
unconvincing in equal measure. Whilst the National Planning Commission and 
NEDLAC Agreements have generated implicit decarbonisation frameworks and 
advisory bodies based on the just transition narrative with broad support, they 
continue to be countered by a status quo coalition of stronger institutional form: 
vested interests in coal and nuclear power continue to resist change, together 
with path-dependent thinking in the Department of Energy, NERSA and (to 
a lessening extent) Eskom. As a result, energy policy and regulation are yet to be 
influenced by the mitigation agenda, even in its just transition guide. The 
expanded composition of the new Inter-Ministerial Committee of the Climate 
Change Bill is significant. If politics within the ANC were to shift so that that 
these key individuals might be committed to decarbonization, this would open 
the door for climate institutionalisation in the country’s key emitting sector. 
Until such a time, however, the redistributive transformation priorities of labour 
and society appear beached on a path dependent energy policy, reinforced by 
a regulatory and institutional form that is not keeping pace with the technolo-
gical energy transition, climate imperatives and the reality of Eskom’s weakened 
state. The new and potentially productive just transition narrative lacks the 
institutional vehicles – and leadership – with which to turn it into reality.
Synthesis: South African climate institutionalisation in form and 
function
In this section, we use the observations just outlined to draw out the comparative 
implications of the South African experience. Climate institutions are still clearly 
evolving, but we can conduct an initial evaluation of how well they fulfil the 
basic climate governance functions addressed in this special issue. This will yield 
insights pertinent to both South Africa’s decarbonisation challenges and the 
comparative varieties of climate governance.
South African proposals for purpose-built climate institutions have typi-
cally involved coordinating bodies with representation from existing govern-
mental institutions. The inter-ministerial proposals in the 2011 White Paper 
and in the 2018 Climate Change Bill both have this form of horizontal 
coordination between national departments, while the inter-governmental 
body of 2008 included different levels of government. The institutions func-
tioned well enough to produce the White Paper itself, but no such bodies are 
currently operating effectively, leaving most climate action by default to the 
Department of Environment. This department has often followed the expec-
tations of international climate negotiations rather than domestic processes, 
judging by the timing and nature of its initiatives. Whilst South Africa has 
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always had climate institutions and processes that consult relevant stake-
holders, this consultation rarely generates consensus on paths forward, but 
rather exposes deep disagreement on the desired speed and scope of climate 
action Figure 2 shows these formal climate institutions in graphical form.
However, what is clearly evident in the discussion of the stages above is 
the role of the dominant energy sector and its institutions, which have 
successfully resisted meaningful decarbonisation throughout the period. 
Ting and Byrne (2020) used the Multi-Level Perspective of the socio- 
technical transitions literature to describe the South African electricity 
space as comprising an MEC-based incumbent regime. It is engaged in 
a contestation of power with low carbon niches, which plays out in the multi- 
dimensional institutions of its ‘selection environment’. This environment is, 
in turn, stacked towards the incumbent regime. Energy institutions can 
therefore be understood to be playing a kind of shadow climate institutional 
role, and as such are an important vantage point for evaluating institutional 
configurations pertinent to decarbonisation, including the role of the coun-
try’s socio-economic transformation objective. The full suite of institutions 
affecting South Africa’s climate outcomes is depicted in the figure below.
Turning to the governance challenges, the first is to have institutions that 
effectively grapple with the scope and scale of action needed to mitigate 
climate change. At first glance, things look promising. South Africa’s co- 
ordinating climate institutions were able to undertake important economy- 
wide initiatives over the decades, developing the Peak Plateau and Decline 
trajectory and proposing a full policy suite: two economy-wide instruments 
Figure 2. Institutions affecting climate outcomes in South Africa.
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and flagship programmes in various key sectors. The Department of 
Environment has ramped up its capacity significantly over the past decade 
to respond to the climate change agenda. As such, South Africa is both 
ambitious and unusual as a developing country.
However, a closer look reveals that this institutional form is a necessary 
but insufficient response to the governance challenge of scope and scale. 
Limited in its political clout due to the extensive reach of the MEC regime’s 
power, South Africa’s institutional co-ordination across government is 
superficial. Instead, different departmental efforts are subjected to deep 
mutual mistrust. Treasury and the Department of Environment have two 
different economy-wide measures reflecting their radically different cogni-
tive orientations, and have not been able to reconcile them. Even more 
critically though no climate institution has yet been able to impose losses 
on the electricity sector incumbents or govern the country’s inevitable energy 
transition. South Africa’s climate institutional form is therefore one that can 
deliver high level, internationally impressive targets and trajectories, but, 
upon scrutiny, is revealed to be powerless over the country’s main emitting 
sector. For countries like South Africa where emissions are concentrated in 
one systemically important, powerful, and resistant sector, it may be that the 
scope and scale of governance challenge is really about overcoming the 
resistance of this most important sector.
The domination of the energy sector also affects the second governance 
challenge of climate institutions, which is whether they can strategically set 
the stage for transformative change. In the South African case, this transfor-
mative change must take the form of redirecting the energy sector away from 
fossil fuels. South African institutions began the crucial task of setting 
evidence-based goals in 2007, with the LTMS planning exercise. Whilst 
a derivative of these goals was subsequently embedded in energy planning, 
the LTMS documents themselves downplayed the structural changes that 
would be required to actually follow them. Even with an agreed roadmap, the 
struggles of the second stage were about the difficulty of achieving consensus 
around those and related goals.
Ironically, some of the most important steps toward climate transformation 
have come from larger energy sectoral dynamics outside either national or 
international climate dynamics. For example, the global cost maturation of 
wind and solar power helped to stall South Africa’s nuclear aspirations, under-
mining the rationale for Eskom as a large monopolistic utility (Bischof-Niemtz 
and Creamer 2019). State capture has also helped to accelerate Eskom’s demise 
(Chipkin, Ivor and Mark Swilling 2017). Ting and Byrne characterise this as 
a growing contextual discontinuity of the incumbent regime whose institu-
tions, notwithstanding these exogenous changes, have remained anti- 
mitigation. The technical capacity for planning transformation still outstrips 
the ability to institutionalise decarbonisation in energy, including the political 
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follow-through that would embed technical plans in an appropriate political 
narrative.
The third challenge, that of mediating the politics of climate action, is 
entwined in the just transformation of the country’s political and economic 
relationships, and unsurprisingly also plays out within the energy institu-
tions. In the first stage, path-dependent energy institutions operating within 
the sector’s regulated monopolistic institutional structure prioritised low- 
cost electricity and redistributive development objectives above those of 
climate mitigation by expanding coal infrastructure. In the second stage, 
Zuma utilised the racial transformation agenda for his own ends, in the 
process perversely up-ending both Eskom’s redistributive development and 
its low-cost electricity mandate. In stage three, the long shadow of Zuma’s 
exploitation of the racial transformation objective, together with the ongoing 
activity of the rent-seeking faction in government and unresolved differences 
around economic development models, hamper sectoral reform and cast 
suspicion over international renewable investors. Weak as it is, Eskom still 
holds its monopoly position despite its inability to finance the cost- 
competitive new generation capacity so desperately required to deliver on 
its developmental mandates. Nominally, climate institutions have been able 
to do little in mediating any of these political debates.
Taken as a whole, then, all three of South Africa’s climate governance 
challenges are ultimately dependent on re-orientating the institutions of the 
dominant energy sector towards decarbonisation. As such, the South African 
case offers some caveats to any easy assumptions about the virtues of either 
coordinated or polycentric governance. With a resistant regime in a sector 
that dominates emissions, decarbonisation must be institutionalised in that 
sector, and climate institutional form itself may be less decisive. Ting and 
Byrne’s (2020) analysis suggests that the incumbent regime’s growing con-
textual discontinuity, together with the balance of power between the regime 
and the low carbon upstarts, ultimately determine the pace of institutionalis-
ing decarbonisation in the energy sector. This is no linear, staged climate 
governance progression then, but rather an ongoing push and pull between 
incumbent regimes and niches in the all-important emissions dominant 
sector, confounded by entirely non-climate related occurrences such as 
state capture.
Conclusion
After a promising start, South Africa’s climate-orientated institutions have 
never managed to develop much influence over the country’s overwhel-
mingly dominant emitting sector: energy, based on coal. Insights into the 
evolutionary path of this institutional form are provided by the explanatory 
factors described in the introduction to this special issue. South Africa’s 
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penchant for taking a high-profile moral stance in international environ-
mental negotiations together with intractable domestic energy politics led to 
an unsuccessful navigation of Putnam’s two-level game. National bureau-
cratic characteristics contributed to weak and incompatible economy-wide 
mitigation instruments. And only in the third stage has there been promise of 
an appropriate framing narrative to start to address the final and most 
significant factor – South Africa’s long struggle to mediate the politics of 
energy and climate. The net result is a weak set of formal climate institutions, 
and poor progress on institutionalising decarbonisation in the systemically 
important energy sector.
In terms of the challenges of climate governance, the country has a strong 
technical capacity for planning. This is most clearly demonstrated in the 
LTMS Planning process of 2006/7 which delivered an economy-wide dec-
arbonisation vision and strategy that was ahead of its time. Yet these climate 
mitigation ambitions and plans have failed to embed in an appropriate 
institutional form that achieves traction in the energy sector. This is the 
key climate governance objective of countries where a single sector dom-
inates emissions. South Africa’s energy sector has a particularly complex 
political economy to navigate as the country’s colonial and apartheid history 
has resulted in critical needs for poverty and inequality alleviation that still 
depend on transformation of the economy. The energy sector, and Eskom in 
particular, have been used to respond to this, albeit from within particular 
ideological perspectives. In a perverse twist, the Zuma administration used 
these same racial transformation objectives as part of a cover for a state 
capture project that targeted national energy institutions and confounded 
both the incumbent MEC regime’s transition resistance, as well as the 
attempts of low carbon niches to gain traction. A ‘just energy transition’ 
narrative still struggles to find a foothold that can lead to real transformation.
In the South African case, therefore, questions around the form of climate- 
focused institutions appear to be a distraction from the main arena of climate 
institutional governance in the country, the energy sector. Here, an incumbent 
regime has been engaged in an ongoing battle with low carbon niche incursions, 
a battle that plays out across the sector’s institutions – which are orientated 
towards maintaining the carbon-intensive incumbents. The South African case 
highlights the need for the concept of climate institutions to accommodate 
institutions that do not have climate governance as their primary objective, at 
least in instances where one sector dominates in emissions and power.
Notes
1. Interview with representative of Energy Intensive Users Group (EIUG) (2018).
2. Interview with representative of civil society 2 (2019).
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3. This began as the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), 
until 2011, when it became just the Department of Environmental Affairs 
(DEA). In 2019, it was renamed the Department of Environment, Forestry 
and Fisheries (DEFF). For simplicity, we refer to all of these as the ‘Department 
of Environment’.
4. Interview with representative of civil society 1 (2019).
5. Interviews with representative of Eskom (2014) and EUIG (2018).
6. Interviews with representative of the EIUG and the Industry Task Team on 
Climate Change (ITTCC) (2019); interview with civil society representative 2 
(2019).
7. Interview with representative of National Treasury (2019).
8. Interview with representative of civil society 1 (2019).
9. Interview with representative of civil society 1 (2019).
10. Interview with representative of National Treasury (2019).
11. Interviews with representative of the EIUG 2 (2018) and representative of 
Academia 3 (2019).
12. Interview with representative of EIUG 1 (2018).
13. Interview with representative of civil society 2 (2019); representative of the 
renewable energy industry (2019).
14. Interview with representative of the renewable energy industry (2019).
15. Interview with representative of civil society 2 (2019).
16. E.g. https://www.scribd.com/document/390031857/Minister-of-Finance 
-s-Statement-at-the-State-Capture-Inquiry#download.
17. Interview with representative of civil society (2014).
18. Interview with representative of National Treasury (2019).
19. Interview with representative of Civil Society (2018).
20. Interview with representative of Academia 3 (2019).
21. Interview with representative of Academia 3 (2019).
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